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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Spent Fuel Dry Storage
Recently, spent fuel dry storage demands, rather than
wet storage, are continuously increasing in other nuclear
countries owing to various advantages such as easy system
installation, expandability, transportability, economical
efficiency, safety, and public acceptance. According to the
latest announcement of the government [1] which includes
an expansion plan of nuclear power up to 59%, the spent
fuel accumulation problem will be more severe in Korea.
Among the several available alternative options to solve
this problem, dry storage could be most realistic and pos-
sible in the near future because of the limited space in spent
fuel pools for transshipment between nuclear power plants,
the uncertainty of the pyro process success at the commercial
scale, which needs to be further developed over a long
period, and the obscurity of the deep disposal implemen-
tation schedule, which is the last procedure scheduled fol-
lowing the others [2]. 
1.2 Spent Fuel Integrity Evaluation
The ultimate objectives of spent fuel dry storage are
to prevent a gross rupture of the spent fuel during operation
and to keep its retrievability until transportation because
storage implementation was born conceptually as an inter-
mediate method before a permanent decision [3]. These
objectives have led to active spent fuel integrity evaluation
research prior to storage system development. Among the
main safety evaluation items of dry storage system includ-
ing structure, confinement, shielding, criticality, thermal,
and material degradation, the last two items are directly
related to spent fuel integrity. In particular, the peak rod
temperature in the dry storage system has a great influence
on the system design criteria and is the only controllable
parameter in a passive cooling system such as dry storage.
Fig. 1 shows the relationships among the various nuclear
fuel degradation mechanisms, which are established based
on the key role that fuel temperature takes. In a dry storage
condition, this dependency on fuel temperature can be more
dominant because other mechanisms except creep and
hydrogen effect had already stopped its progression after
reactor operation.
Fuel temperature and burnup can play a key role in
determining the oxide layer thickness, hydrogen pickup
fraction, fission gas release rate, rod internal pressure,
and hoop stress on the inner cladding wall. The cladding
material condition, which is determined by the reactor’s
operation history, is also again becoming dependent on the
storage temperature history. All efforts for calculating the
temperature of all system components are focused on low-
ering the fuel temperature under the safety criteria, which
Among the several options to solve PWR spent fuel accumulation problem in Korea, the dry storage method could be the
most realistic and applicable solution in the near future. As the basic objectives of dry storage are to prevent a gross rupture of
spent fuel during operation and to keep its retrievability until transportation, at the same time the importance of a spent fuel
integrity evaluation that can estimate its condition at the final stage of dry storage is very high. According to the national need
and technology progress, two representative nations of spent fuel dry storage, the USA and Japan, have established different
system temperature criteria, which is the only controllable factor in a dry storage system. However, there are no technical
criteria for this evaluation in Korea yet, it is necessary to review the previously well-organized methodologies of advanced
countries and to set up our own domestic evaluation direction due to the nation’s need for dry storage. To satisfy this necessity,
building a domestic spent fuel test database should be the first step. Based on those data, it is highly recommended to compare
domestic data range with foreign results, to build our own criteria, and to expand on evaluation work into recently issued
integrity problems by using a comprehensive integrity evaluation code. 
KEYWORDS : Spent Fuel, Integrity, Dry Storage
115NUCLEAR ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY,  VOL.45  NO.1  FEBRUARY 2013
http://dx.doi.org/10.5516/NET.06.2012.016
Technical Note
were established through spent fuel integrity evaluations.
Therefore, in this work, it is very important to estimate
the actual fuel cladding temperature as precisely as possible
and evaluate the remaining engineering margin of the
cladding within a target dry storage operation lifetime [4]. 
2. STATUS OF SPENT FUEL INTEGRITY
EVALUATION IN ADVANCED COUNTRIES
Germany and the USA have performed spent fuel
integrity evaluation since the middle of the 1970’s, just
after cancelling the reprocess policy for spent fuel man-
agement. They established almost the same peak rod
temperature criteria methodologies for a dry storage system
based on 10 years of research results, and applied this
criteria to a commercial dry storage system, which started
in 1985 [5]. Recently, Japan has also performed spent fuel
integrity evaluation for almost 10 years to establish its own
criteria methodology before building the massive AFR dry
storage in Mutsu city. By understanding their background,
comparing these old and new methodologies, referring to
their results, and considering specific domestic situations,
it is necessary to shape Korea’s own methodology.
2.1 Status of the USA
2.1.1 Historical Changes of Spent Fuel Management
Policies
After abandoning reprocessing, a deep repository has
been the national policy for commercial spent fuel manage-
ment in the USA. However, dry storage, which was an
inevitable option until the Yucca mountain repository open,
has grown beyond its initial 20 year operation lifetime
owing to a repository project delay. The Dry Cask Storage
Characterization (DCSC) project [6] supported additional
40 year lifetime extension in 2005 for existing dry storage
systems (ISFSIs) by inspecting the spent fuel and dry storage
system, which had been in operation for about 14.5 years
in the field. The best pursuable basis for 40 year extension
is that initial 20 years of spent fuel may be in its most
dangerous time in terms of radiation and decay heat level,
and that the existing dry storage facilities have already
passed this critical time frame. The whole storage activities
of spent fuel includes currently 60 years in wet storage,
according to the nuclear reactor building license, 20 years
in an initial dry storage, and more 40 years in additional
dry storage. Relatively new dry storage systems, which
started operation after 2005, have only a 40 year license,
and another 40 year extension is being considered. High
burnup spent fuel dry storage system has been licensed for
20 years from 2005. Suspension of the Yucca Mountain
Project (YMP) in 2010 [7] forced the Blue Ribbon Commis-
sion [8] to find another good alternative idea and the stake-
holders to consider an extremely very long term dry storage
beyond 120 years [9]. Fig. 2 shows a conceptual diagram
of the historical changes in the spent fuel dry storage license
in the USA. Fig. 3 shows the change of spent fuel dry
storage demand after the YMP cancellation in the USA [10].
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Fig. 3. Change of Spent Fuel Dry Storage Demand in the USA.
Fig. 1. Nuclear Fuel Rod Degradation Relationship. Fig. 2. Historical License Changes of Dry Storage in the USA.
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2.1.2 License Scheme in the USA
The technical criteria on the spent fuel dry storage in
the USA are based on 10CFR72, and there are two kinds
of licenses; ‘Site specific License (SL) [11]’ and ‘General
License (GL) [12]’. The most noticeable differences be-
tween these two license systems are in the matter of a ‘public
hearing process’ and a ‘Certificate of Compliance (CoC)’.
There are a large amount of requirements for a SL, such as
a nuclear power plant operation license, which includes a
‘site specific’ analysis of the surrounding environments.
A SL also requires a public hearing process around the site,
and therefore, a utility sometimes has to modify the spent
fuel dry storage system based on the public willingness. On
the other hand, a GL uses a ‘CoC’ philosophy, which means
that if a dry storage system vendor acquires a ‘CoC’ for a
given system from the US NRC by an independent approval
process before the system is sold to the utility, this ‘CoC’
removes the need for a public hearing, and therefore, the
utility only needs to buy a system to their taste and install it
in their nuclear power plant site without any public hearing
process. Based on the ‘CoC’ strategy, the GL process pro-
vides convenience, flexibility, shorter installation time, and
economical advantage. For these reasons, the GL is recently
more dominant in the USA except very unique cases like
earthquake zones.
2.1.3 Methodology Changes of Spent Fuel Integrity
Evaluation
Spent fuel integrity research in the USA was led by
the Commercial Spent Fuel Management (CSFM) [13]
program in the 1970’s-80’s. As a final result, creep was
considered as the most important degradation mechanism
for cladding integrity in dry storage by referring to creep
and creep rupture maps [14]. To prevent creep from pro-
gressing, independent storage temperatures have been
suggested depending on the spent fuel species, cladding
materials, burnup levels, and charging gases in the storage
system, and these various temperature limits for each
system were applied until 1997 [15]. The initial NUREG
-1536 report, published in 1997 [16], included Diffusion-
controlled Cavity Growth (DCCG) as an important cladding
degradation mechanism. However the Interim Staff Guide
(ISG)-11, published in 1999, which was used to supplement
NUREG-1536, excluded DCCG because of its extremely
low occurring possibility in dry storage operation and used
‘low burnup spent fuel’ to represent lower than 45,000
MWd/MtU burnup spent fuels. The revised ISG-11 (Rev. 1)
in 2000 considered the oxide layer thickness and restricted
less than 1 % creep of spent fuel cladding [17]. The sec-
ondary revision, ISG-11 (Rev. 2) in 2002, noticed that while
creep is the most important degradation mechanism of
spent fuel cladding in dry storage, it does not appear to be
a critical threat to spent fuel integrity as it shows a self-
limiting phenomenon. The temperature of a spent fuel
dry storage system decreases at a very slow rate over its
lifetime and this almost near constant value (T) for a short
range time sets the right-hand side of the well-known Eq.
(1) constant. As the creep progresses further, the volume
of the fuel rod (V) will be expanded, yet on the other hand,
the internal pressure of the fuel rod (P) has to decrease
owing to the constant value on the right side. This decreased
internal pressure does not push the fuel rod wall any more
like in the previous step, and therefore, creep can be called
a self-limiting mechanism.
PV=nRT    Eq. (1)
Based on experience for dry storage operation, the
second revision of ISG-11 (Rev. 2) suggested a uniform
temperature limit for cladding. This uniform temperature
(400 ºC) has a little more thermal margin than the previous
storage systems, which have a specific system-inherent
temperature limit around 340~380 ºC range values deter-
mined by the peak rod temperature calculation methodology
regarding the characteristics of the target spent fuel to be
stored. This higher temperature is interpreted as a buffer
for an uncertainty of merging various temperature criteria
on several zirconium-based alloys and gives the system de-
signers & the operators greater engineering margin. At the
same time it also gives the regulators more convenience for
the review process. The restricted temperature range within
65 ºC for the repeated thermal cycling which is needed for
hydride precipitation supersaturation in a short thermal cycle
was also suggested to limit the decreases in ductility and
fracture toughness that may be associated with hydride
reorientation in this version. 
The third revision of ISG-11 (Rev.3) in 2003 [18]
clarified the maximum number of thermal cycling as less
than 10 cycles based on technical research work by Kam-
menzind [19]. This was suggested to prevent any breakage
during a transient situation such as transportation since
this thermal cycling can cause radial (re-oriented) hydride
formation which makes the cladding vulnerable to impact.
For less than 45,000 MWd/MtU burnup spent fuel, other
criteria was suggested as an alternative to the unified tem-
perature(400 ºC) based on unirradiated cladding research
work by Kese [20]; a higher short-term temperature above
(400 ºC) could be applied as long as the best estimate clad-
ding hoop stress is equal to or less than 90 MPa. This limi-
tation for hoop stress on cladding was intended to preclude
the formation of radial hydrides. However, according to
Fig. 4, because hoop stress is directly related to temperature,
the above new suggestion just offer a selective preference
to regulation reviewer.
The technical bases report [21] suggested the most
considerable degradation mechanisms for fuel and cladding
for additional storage (40 years from 2005), which are
listed on Table 1. This table shows that a number of con-
siderable degradation mechanisms for additional storage
was reduced, and that it focuses on off-normal and accident
conditions. Moreover, the hydride effect is becoming im-
portant as the storage system temperature decreases. In this
table, we can find which degradation mechanism can be
dominant in each time frame using the temperature range
for that time, and realize that the fuel pellet has no problem
and creep is no longer critical in additional storage, and
recognize that because of transportation at the end of storage,
cladding degradation induced by hydride is increasing in
importance as time goes by and the system temperature
drops. In 2010, NUREG-1536 Revision 1 was published,
which reflected all previous technical changes and catego-
rized the operation mode as normal, off-normal, and acci-
dent. An off-normal condition conceptually means ‘once
per year’, and an accident condition conceptually means
‘once per system lifetime’ from a probabilistic point of view.
This revision has also deployed the risk assessment con-
cept to regulator’s reviewing process by classifying all check
points as high, medium, or low level. This risk assessment
concept for every dry storage ‘system, structure and com-
ponents’ (SSC) has been popularly applied to an ‘extended
storage gap analysis’, which is a hot issue in the USA. 
2.1.4 Recent Tendency for Extended Storage
Recently a very long-term (extended) storage movement
of over 120 years had led to a new research necessity for
spent fuel integrity evaluation. Table 2 compares the
spent fuel research work area of the initial and extended
storage periods briefly.
Considering extended storage, several blind points of
the DCSC project implementation have been brought to
light, and the belief of the most dangerous initial 20 years
of spent fuel in dry storage has been challenged owing to
the significant hydride effect in low temperature ranges
for the remaining 40 years [22]. To solve these problems
or challenges of extended storage, technical gap analysis
of research between the initial dry storage and new extended
storage has been performed by 4 organizations indepen-
dently [23]. Table 3 summarizes the draft prioritizations
of the research items for major SSCs except the Nuclear
Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB). Focusing on
spent fuel related items, fuel pellet is not important, and
on the other hand, cladding degradation mechanisms
related to the hydride effect as the system temperature
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Storage operation
time (years)
Burnup (MWd/MtU)
Cladding Material
Most important degra-
dation mechanism of
cladding
Main consideration
20
< 45,000
Zr-4
Creep
Normal storage
80~300
< 62,000
Zr-4, ZIRLO, M5, etc
Hydride Embrittlement
Material degradation for
very long-term storage &
transportation condition
Initial Storage Extended Storage
Table 2. Comparison of Spent Fuel Research between Initial
and Extended Storage.
Fig. 4. Relationship between Temperature and Hoop Stress in
Cladding.
Table 1. Considerable Degradation Mechanism for Additional
Storage.
Mechanism
Oxidation
FGR
Creep
DCCG
H2 reorientation
DHC
SCC
H2 embrittlement
H2 migration
Annealing
Crud Spallation
Off-Normal
Oxidation due to air ingress
Creep
Annealing
Accident-impact
Fracture
Oxidation
Impact Breach
Crud spallation
Accident-fire
Stress rupture
Annealing
H2 reorientation
N
Y
Y
DE
DE
N
N
Y
DE
DE
Y
N
Y
N
May be
N
Y
Y
May be
Y
Y
Y
DE
DE
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
DE
DE
DE
DE
Y
Y
Y
Fuel
Extend
-ed
Cladding
Initial Extend
-ed
Initial
Normal
DHC = Delayed Hydrogen Cracking 
DCCG = Diffusion Controlled Cavitation Growth     
FGR = Fission Gas Release                    
SCC = Stress Corrosion Cracking 
DE = Depends on the Event
drops with time are the main issue for extended storage
[24][25]. 
The new necessity for spent fuel integrity research on
extended storage includes a long-term full-scale demon-
stration using the high burnup spent fuels [26]. Active and
deep opinions about this are discussed through the Extended
Storage Collaboration Program (ESCP), which has been
led by EPRI [27]. Moreover, Used Fuel Disposition (UFD)
which has been led by the US DOE is considering spent fuel
management in the big picture including storage, trans-
portation, and disposal [28]. This program is also partici-
pating in data acquisition examination of high burnup
spent fuel and a joint demonstration with ESCP. These
activities are expected to produce reliable research results
for the listed items in Table 3.
2.2 Status of Japan
Based on a reprocessing policy for spent fuel in Japan,
several consignments of spent fuel reprocessing in other
countries have been accomplished until 2003, and a new
domestic reprocessing facility, the Rokkasho Reprocessing
Plant (RRP), has not yet started its commercial operation
because of a technical problem [29]. As the RRP cannot
handle its expected capacity of 800 tU per year in 2010,
the spent fuel accumulation problem in Japan is becoming
serious, and this situation led to a massive dry storage
necessity until a successful reprocessing facility begin
operation (Fig. 5) [30]. Following a successive small
amount of dry storage operation at the Fukusima and
Tokai sites, a large-scale (5,000 tU in two steps) AFR dry
storage will be operated in Mutsu October 2013. [31].
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Table 3. Summary of Technical Gap Analysis Results.
Priority DOE NRC EPRI
•Air oxidation
•DHC
•H2 embrittlement
•Hydride Reorientation
•Oxidation
•Creep
•Annealing of radiation damage
•DHC
•Hydride Reorientation
•Ductile-to-brittle transition
Temperature
•Metallic seal and bolts
corrosion 
•Canister SCC
•DHC
•Hydride Embrittlement
•Hydride Reorientation
•Ductile-to-brittle transition
Temperature
•Low Temperature Anneal
•Metallic seals corrosion
•Loss of ductility
•Bolt corrosion
•Bolt Creep
•Canister SCC
•SCC
•Thermal Aging Effect
•Creep
•Embrittlement and Cracking
•Corrosion(Blistering)
•Atmospheric corrosion
•Aqueous corrosion
•Thermomechanical fatigue of
seals and bolts
•Atmospheric corrosion
•Aqueous corrosion
•Freeze-thaw
•Corrosion of embedded steel
Medium
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
High
Medium
High
Medium
Cladding
Fuel Pellet
Fuel Assembly
Hardware
Neutron Poison
Bolted Lid
System
Welded Canister
System
Concrete
Overpack & Pad
Fig. 5. Spent Fuel Accumulation Projection and its Expected
Solutions.
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2.2.1 Methodology of Spent Fuel Integrity Evaluation
The ultimate objective of spent fuel storage in Japan is
to keep its integrity by disallowing a failure due to thermal
creep and a loss of mechanical properties due to cladding
degradation. Spent fuel integrity research for only one
rod has been performed for about 20 years at the Central
Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI). It
was concluded that there was no significant problem with
this test rod [32]. A small amount of dry storage at the
Fukusima and Tokai sites can be installed based on the
above results for spent fuel integrity. However, a new large-
scale necessity of dry storage has led to a more distinctive
concept. The main idea of dry storage in Japan is a ‘Holistic
Approach’, which means no opening of a cask lid until the
reprocessing step using a Dual Purpose Dry Metal Cask
(DPDMC) for 50 years of storage and transportation to the
reprocessing facility [33]. To implement this, a new need
for their own technical criteria for dry storage has arisen.
For spent fuel integrity criteria, the Japan Nuclear Energy
Safety (JNES) supported by the Nuclear and Industrial
Safety Agency (NISA) has studied thermal creep, hydrogen
distribution & hydride reorientation, and irradiation hard-
ening & recovery using various burnup range spent fuels
for about 10 years [34]. Table 4 shows chronological test
information including a single effect test item and spent
fuel species. More detailed test information on creep and
hydride reorientation is summarized in Table 5. 
In the results of the creep test, the transition threshold
strain for the irradiated cladding was much larger than 1 %,
and therefore the usual criteria of 1 % creep strain may be
a sufficient engineering margin for thermal creep single
effect. This means that thermal creep is not a significant
degradation mechanism for spent fuel cladding in dry stor-
age conditions. For the results of irradiation hardening &
recovery, nothing special has been pointed out. Regarding
the hydride effect test, it was reported that cladding, which
did not have any reoriented hydride, suffered ductile degra-
dation. This fact induced a more extensive and conservative
criteria, which does not allow degradation of cladding for
mechanical properties and material ductility, while the
USA only restricts the condition of hydride reorientation
occurring. Based on these results, Table 6 shows the con-
clusive safety criteria of spent fuel integrity with regard
to ductility degradation. 
Test
Creep
Hydride
Reorientation
Burnup (MWd/MtU)
50,000
55,000
48,000
55,000
40,000
50,000
55,000
39,000
48,000
55,000
BWR(Zry-2)
BWR(Zry-2)
PWR(Zry-4)
PWR(Zry-4, MDA, ZIRLO)
BWR(Zry-2 without liner)
BWR(Zry-2 with liner)
BWR(Zry-2 with liner)
PWR(Zry-4)
PWR(Zry-4)
PWR(MDA, ZIRLO)
Cladding Temperature (ºC)
330~420
250~400
Hoop Stress (MPa)
30~300
16~130
Table 5. Detailed Test Information on Creep and Hydride Reorientation.
Table 4. Chronological Test Informaion.
Item FY 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Survey and Planning
Creep Test
Creep Test
Creep Rupture Test
PWR48GWd/t, BWR50GWd/t PWR55GWd/t, BWR55GWd/t
PWR48GWd/t, 55GWd/t
BWR40GWd/t, 50GWd/t, 55GWd/t
(< 330 ºC)
PWR48GWd/t, BWR50GWd/t
PWR48GWd/t, 55GWd/t (330-420 ºC)
Hydride Effects Evaluation Test
Hydride Reorientation Test
Mechanical Property Test
Irradiation Hardening Recovery Test
Compared to the USA, which uses uniform criteria
(400 ºC) for zirconium-based alloy cladding, various
temperatures dependent on fuel type, cladding material,
cladding inner liner, and burnup will be applied to the new
massive dry storage system in Japan. Another distinction
is a hoop stress restriction, which is applied with temper-
ature in two dimensions compared to the USA, which uses
only one restriction (temperature or hoop stress). These
conservative criteria demand a dry storage system with a
much higher cooling efficiency, and could be applied to
the new Japanese dry storage systems, which are all metal
cask types.
2.2.2 Long-term Demonstration Program
The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) which is in
the highest position among Japanese nuclear organizations,
has recommended several utilities to perform a long-term
spent fuel integrity demonstration program to accumulate
the knowledge & experience of PWR spent fuel dry storage,
confirm the long-term integrity of spent fuel, and finally
convince people of safety. It is because the previous dry
storage systems were only for BWR spent fuels [35]. Two
assemblies will be installed in this demonstration system,
and their basic information is summarized in Table 7.
This demonstration test has focused on only spent fuel
integrity, not the dry storage system. Spent fuel integrity
will be periodically checked by a visual test before instal-
lation and by a Kr-85 inspection with temperature and
pressure gauging on the cask lid. At the end of the 60 year
demonstration, only a visual inspection is planned for the
final spent fuel integrity for now. This demonstration is
expected to show the public the reliability of the spent fuel
integrity in real time and to reach a more positive consensus
on long-term spent fuel dry storage. 
3. FORWARD DIRECTION OF SPENT FUEL
INTEGRITY EVALUATION IN KOREA
3.1 Inevitable need for Spent Fuel Dry Storage
Though the expectation time of spent fuel pool satu-
ration was recently estimated as the middle of the 2020’s,
which is about 10 years later than the previous analysis,
other solutions for the spent fuel accumulation problem
such as the pyro processing and the direct disposal do not
seem to be implemented at a commercial scale until that
time. Therefore, spent fuel dry storage is an inevitable
option in Korea in the near future, and has to be imple-
mented within a spent fuel management master roadmap
of the national policy. Considering the above two leading
country cases, the criteria for spent fuel integrity is depend-
ent on the national policy for spent fuel management and
the main concept for restriction target and range. Likewise,
a national policy of Korea on spent fuel management
should be chosen first, and various boundary conditions
of dry storage such as installation location, operation time,
target spent fuel range and storage system types should
then be determined considering public hearing. Based on
the above policy and boundary conditions, a spent fuel
integrity evaluation has to be performed to ensure that the
domestic spent fuels to be stored in any dry storage system
can keep its integrity for the given lifetime. The charac-
teristic test data of domestic spent fuel is essential for this
evaluation and could have a significant influence on the
dry storage system design as a key factor. As this data
acquisition demands lots of time and effort, it should be
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Fuel
BWR
(RX)
PWR
(SR)
Burnup (MWd/MtU)
40,000
50,000
55,000
39,000
48,000
55,000
55,000
Zry-2 without Liner
Zry-2 with Liner
Zry-2 with Liner
Zry-4
Zry-4
MDA
ZIRLO
≤ 200
≤ 300
≤ 300
≤ 275
≤ 275
≤ 250
≤ 250
≤ 70
≤ 70
≤ 70
≤ 100
≤ 100
≤ 90
≤ 90
Cladding Temp. (ºC) Hoop Stress (MPa)
Table 6. Safety Criteria of Spent Fuel Integrity in Japan.
Burnup
(MWd/MtU)
Cooling time
Cladding
Remarks
48,000
19 years
(as of Oct. 2012)
Zr-4
15 empty fuel rods
which were for
JNES single effect
test
55,000
≥10 years
(as of Oct. 2022)
MDA or ZIRLO
Fuel Assembly-1 Fuel Assembly-2
Table 7. Fuel Assemblies for a Demonstration Test.
implemented far before the storage system design. Fig. 6
helps us understand the necessity of spent fuel test data
acquisition and an integrity evaluation ahead of the system
design and operation.
3.2 Review on Previous Data and Production of Test
Data
Even though the major characteristics of spent fuel
needed for dry storage are the initial enrichment, decay heat,
burnup, and cooling time, the operation history in the reac-
tor is very critical for a detailed spent fuel integrity evalu-
ation. According to the fuel performance code (FRAPCON-
III) output, the burnup history in each operation cycle in
a reactor has a significant influence on the final material
properties of spent fuel, such as the oxide layer thickness
and hydrogen pickup fraction for the same burnup condi-
tion. For example, Fig. 7 shows that spent fuel, which has
been burned quite significantly in the first and second
operation cycles (case 5, case 7), has a thicker oxide layer
and more hydrogen concentration than the other cases
(especially case 4) [36] .
In this context, the greater than 90% capacity factor of
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Fig. 6. Chronological Spent Fuel Dry Storage and its Integrity Evaluation.
Fig. 7. Influence of Burnup History on Spent Fuel Material Properties.
Korean nuclear power plants compared to the less than 80%
as the world average [37] (especially before 2000) is con-
cerned for the final spent fuel conditions (Fig. 8) because
there is still no evidence or test data to confirm that those
high capacity factors do not have any significant effect on
spent fuels which are considered as the first dry storage
target, even though this is a very impressive achievement
from a reactor operation point of view. 
Therefore, it is necessary to produce domestic spent
fuel test data to confirm the similarity with the results from
other countries, and to analyze more detailed causes of
discrepancy if they show a different tendency. Creep and
hydride reorientation mechanisms of the cladding are the
most important test items for this purpose [38]: the former
is needed to satisfy the pre-existing well-defined safety
criteria in the advanced countries, and the latter is repre-
sentatively needed to check the decrease of cladding ductility
due to the hydrogen effect, which has become a significant
issue recently [39].
3.3 Development of Spent Fuel Integrity Evaluation
Code
As it is very difficult to inspect or test all spent fuels
to be stored, the final spent fuel condition in dry storage
should be estimated using several codes. There are four
kinds of codes that can support this estimation: a fuel
performance code for the final anticipated material condi-
tions of spent fuel in a pool, a nuclide depletion code for
the radiation level and decay heat of spent fuel, a thermal
analysis code for temperature history on cladding, and an
integrity evaluation code for the final anticipated condition
of spent fuel in dry storage by comprehensively using the
other codes’ outputs as inputs [40]. The last one may consist
of several engineering models, which have to be updated
with validated & verified spent fuel test data to ensure
the retrievability after storage.
3.4 Foreseeable Path for New Demand
While Korea has faced PWR spent fuel dry storage in
the beginning stage, advanced countries are considering
long-term extended storage and preparing R&D topics on
the transportability of high burnup spent fuel, the serious-
ness of the hydride effect in decreasing temperature condi-
tions during dry storage, the behavior of new cladding
materials that have been recently developed and the insuffi-
ciency of the drying process [41-42]. Therefore, it is highly
recommended that a spent fuel evaluation for low burnup
range has to attain the level of advanced countries as soon
as possible, and new work on a high burnup range then
needs to be developed into a collaborative companion.
To do this, building a domestic spent fuel test database
would be the first step [43].
4. CONCLUSION
The ultimate objective of dry storage is to keep re-
trievability of spent fuel during operation lifetime, and this
objective requires a practical spent fuel integrity evaluation
supported by hot test before its implementation in Korea.
Developing a domestic methodology for the safety criteria
is most important and urgent for successful dry storage, and
therefore, it is necessary to refer to the achievements of the
USA and Japan, who have developed different advanced
approaches for integrity criteria according to their needs.
Based on spent fuel experiment data, it is recommended
to compare a domestic data range with foreign results, to
build our own criteria, and to expand evaluation work
into recently issued integrity problems by using a compre-
hensive integrity evaluation code. 
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